The United States of America has been the dominant political and economic world power since the end of World War II. Furthermore, it has benefited not only from the military alliance NATO with nations in Europe but also from strong relationships with transnational organizations like the European Union that share the U.S.’s ideological values of democratic representation, individual liberty, and rule of law. In a world without the uniting force of opposition to the Soviet Union—as during the Cold War—or two clear dominant global political powers, European Union nations, traditionally considered part of the West, are no longer bound by their ideological positions with global powers that have the same value systems. For example, Italy and Portugal have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative to develop their infrastructure [1]. 

In this environment, 62 countries as of 2025 list China as their top trading partner [2]. However, most European Union nations conduct far more trade with other E.U. nations than with China. In response to China’s increasingly dominant position in global trade, the United States has employed protectionist policies, such as tariffs, with the aim of decreasing trade deficits, revitalizing American manufacturing, and fighting unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. Since President Donald Trump enacted his tariffs on “Liberation Day,” the cost of imported goods for American consumers from most countries has increased. Companies including Apple, Johnson & Johnson, and Honda have all promised to increase manufacturing in the United States. Nevertheless, Goldman Sachs economists doubt the effectiveness of broad-based tariffs in leading to job growth, and they are not alone amongst trade experts in this assessment [3].

Since it is in companies’ economic interest to maximize profits by minimizing their operational costs, tariffs are unlikely to successfully counter China’s mass-scale manufacturing base, which is supported by lower labor costs and vertically integrated supplier networks. Additionally, it would be even less effective for European Union nations, which tend to have higher labor costs and produce more high-value goods instead of mass-market goods compared to the United States [4].

Instead of attempting to revive the Western world order of the past, the nations of the West, including the United States, would be better served by increasing investment in the innovations and technological developments cultivated by stronger educational institutions, the rule of law, intellectual freedom, and open markets. Through building intellectual capital and continuing support for service sectors, the West will be able to show the world it is still at the cutting edge of human development while demonstrating political strength through transatlantic unity. In prioritizing intellectual capital and service sectors, supporting Western manufacturing remains critical, although bringing back mass-market manufacturing is not economically feasible on a grand scale. Investing in manufacturing that involves the production of high-value goods, such as high-tech goods, pharmaceutical products, and aerospace, is beneficial because the United States already has a strong position in those industries, with America's edge being reinforced by continued breakthroughs in technological innovation [5]. The United States already has an incredibly strong service industry, which accounts for 76.4 percent of value added to the American GDP in 2021. In the European Union, 70 percent of GDP comes from the service industry as well [6,7]. Furthermore, the West already has a strong intellectual capacity to support the service industry with strong educational institutions for individuals to develop the knowledge needed to enter service industry fields, especially in the United States.[8] 

Moreover, federal support for the research and development of artificial intelligence is critical for the United States to be able to continue dominating the industry, and the Trump administration has taken initiative on this front, outlined in the “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan” strategy earlier this year [9]. The plan prioritizes enabling private-sector-led innovation of AI to improve the capabilities of its applications, building a stronger infrastructure, particularly with regard to energy, for AI, and promoting the use of AI outside of its borders and for national security purposes. These policies will greatly benefit American AI innovation by enabling the development of AI within the United States, but government funding for such early-stage AI projects continues to fall short [10]. Back in 2021, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence proposed doubling government investment in non-defense AI annually, with $32 billion invested by FY2026. However, the federal government had invested only $3.3 billion in such non-defense AI research and development in FY2025. N.S.C.A.I. named brain-drain into the private sector, lack of focus on addressing the needs of the public good, and concentration of American innovation sector jobs created in the cities as the main threats to American technological innovation [11]. With a few coastal cities disproportionately benefiting from innovation-sector jobs in the United States, bridging disparities between the coasts and middle America will be integral in ensuring that AI empowers the entire country’s economy, not just a few coastal cities. 

Although AI is the most commonly discussed technological development presently, the United States can also capitalize on being the center for other technological developments, such as the biomedical industry. While E.U.member-states are also capable of taking advantage of similar technological advantages, a divide between the U.S.and its European allies creates an opportunity for China to weaken the strength of the West. [12] Instead of attempting to go it alone on technological development, the U.S.and its allies in Europe would be better off pooling financial and intellectual capital, since it would enable accelerated growth across partners in the fields of AI, biotechnology, and other cutting-edge industries, while deepening the soft power which binds these nations together. Areas for collaboration are wide and include research and development, cybersecurity, and building common goals and regulations for new technologies [13].

China’s economic leverage, combined with its systematic approach of presenting “mutually beneficial” economic partnerships in individual European nations’ industries, has not only helped China develop, it has also undermined U.S. and Western development. China’s approach works to capitalize on the differences in economic priorities between different European countries and the U.S., necessitating a collective strategy for combating China’s growing influence. While the transatlantic alliance that makes up the West is a plurality, it was forged by the values that enable it to be a hub for innovation. This is the West’s true strength, as innovation requires liberty. If the West is capable of putting differences aside at the foundational level of shared values, then it will be able to function more strongly as a political force to protect its economic interests in an increasingly multipolar world. In the 1990s, mutual economic openness enabled Central European states such as Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia to make the transition to capitalism, which has formed the basis for greater defense and political ties [14]. 

Although E.U. nations are no longer reliant on the U.S. for economic development, transatlantic unity fosters a world where members of the partnership are less reliant on states with different ideological values. China’s approach and outreach succeed when Western coordination and cooperation falters. Building on shared values, the United States and Europe need to align their strategies with unity that is grounded in liberty as not just an ideal, but as a strategy for survival, resilience, and success in the increasingly multipolar world.