On April 12, 2026, Hungarian voters decisively ended the rule of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. His 16-year tenure leading Hungary was one characterized by rampant corruption, willful degradation of democratic institutions, and coordination with international far-right authoritarian forces. Orbán's status as a darling of the far-right internationale makes his fall from power particularly significant, and much time has been committed to speculation as to how results in Hungary may reverberate throughout Europe and the globe. The tone has understandably been hopeful, with many optimistic that Orbán’s end may signal or bring about a decline in the far-right in Europe if not globally. But is that optimism justified? It may not be. Instead, Orbán’s defeat may reflect a general anti-incumbency trend and voter backlash to poor economic conditions and corruption.

Orbán’s Hungary and its End

For 16 years, Viktor Orbán and his party, Fidesz, have dominated Hungarian politics, making Orbán Europe’s longest-serving leader before his landslide defeat in April. During that time, Orbán bulldozed Hungary’s relatively balanced democratic infrastructure in an effort to create what he called an “illiberal democracy.” The result was a rewritten constitution, government institutions and courts filled with Fidesz partisans, election laws written to cripple opposition parties, hollowed out civil society and media, and a deeply corrupt system of patronage. Under Orbán, government contracts and selective taxation policies were geared towards benefiting Orbán allies. Hungary’s richest man and Orbán’s childhood friend, Lőrinc Mészáros, may be the largest beneficiary of this cronyism, crediting his personal relationship with Orbán for his immense fortune [1]. The media was effectively subjugated by the government, with many outlets either losing their licenses or being subsumed by Orbán allies, largely leaving state media as one of the sole sources of information. Even the country’s central bank was effectively under the control of Orbán and Fidesz, with it granting 900 million euros to the government to fund pro-Orbán networks [2]. Universities were also placed under the control of Orbán allies, while the Central European University, founded by Hungarian-born investor and philanthropist George Soros, was forced to cease most of its operations in the country. Elections were tipped in Fidesz’s favor, with constituencies heavily gerrymandered, Hungary’s two-round election system eliminated, and candidates forced to only advertise on state media. It appeared that all the scales were tilted in Orbán’s favor and his defeat was a logistical impossibility. 

Yet on April 12, the opposition finally unseated him from his position. Despite being a former Orbán ally and remaining a staunch conservative, Peter Magyar defeated Orbán in a thorough thrashing that saw his party, Tisza, win 53% of the vote, granting it a 141-seat supermajority to Fidesz’s 52 [3]. Magyar ran on reversing the illiberal reforms of Orbán, dismantling state media, and rewriting Hungary’s constitution. He even pledged to prosecute corrupt government officials and oligarchs who benefited from Orbán’s rule, while also heavily focusing on economic issues and recommitting Hungary to the European Union. Orbán ultimately failed to live up to his promises, and it cost him. Under his watch, Hungary became the poorest country in the Eurozone despite being the largest recipient of EU funds per capita [4]. In the face of the poor economic state of the country, Orbán’s blatant corruption and authoritarian tendencies became impossible for voters to ignore. Yet, his defeat may not signal a global or even European trend of far-right decline. Instead, it likely reflects an ongoing anti-incumbency trend and a response to poor economic conditions combined with corruption, not a decline of the far-right. 

Trends in Europe

To see if a general decline of the far-right is observable, let us look to the performance of Europe’s other far-right parties, starting with Germany, Europe’s largest economy. In Germany, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland remains ascendant. The AfD retains its grip in German localities, winning Thuringia in 2024, and is expected to win an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt, the party’s first such victory [5]. They are even polling at 27% nationally to the ruling CDU’s 23% [6]. If these numbers hold, that would make the AfD Germany’s largest party in its legislature. They are already the second largest party in the German legislature, relegating the SPD to third, a drastic fall from a party that ran the government only an election ago. While these numbers are concerning, the traditional parties of Germany have employed a “firewall” against the AfD that has been successful thus far. Even if the AfD were to win the greatest number of seats, it is unlikely they would be able to cobble together a coalition to actually govern. However, their success at the state level is not to be understated, and further victories may provide them even greater momentum going into federal elections. Furthermore, the “firewall” strategy seems to have only further radicalized the AfD despite its success at barring them from federal power, with members of the party, particularly prominent politicians in Saxony-Anhalt, adopting more extremist rhetoric [7]. In an effort to blunt the rise of the AfD, the CDU has co-opted some AfD stances, particularly a harder line on immigration. It remains to be seen if this strategy will bear fruit, yet thus far it has done little to stem the AfD’s rise. A similar strategy has been adopted in both nearby Denmark and Sweden, with the Swedish ruling party even going so far as to promise their far-right party ministerial positions in a new government [8]. While such a strategy may create inroads with voters on the margins, it also risks legitimizing the far-right and creating a permission structure for them to simply grow more radical. The continued poor performance of the SPD and the fall in standing of the CDU reflect a continued dissatisfaction with traditional political parties and a socially and economically unstable environment. 

In France, a similar, albeit somewhat different, dynamic is playing out. As in Germany, France’s ruling centrist party has faced a marked fall in popularity under President Emmanuel Macron, with a stark 74% disapproving of the President’s performance [9]. Yet despite this daunting position, centrists enjoyed relative success in France’s local elections in March, outperforming the far-right National Rally party [10]. While dissatisfaction with the President is high, center and left-wing parties once again outperformed the National Rally when operating as a combined front. However, this same strategy may be more difficult to employ in France’s presidential elections, set to take place in a year’s time. The race promises to be a highly fractious one, with several candidates appearing poised to run under the banners of the left and the center [11]. Meanwhile, National Rally is positioned to fall behind either Marine Le Pen or her protégé Jordan Bardella. Bardella is likely to step in for Le Pen, assuming her court-ordered ban from running for office stands, and both figures would have a real chance at succeeding the woefully unpopular Macron–a result likely to significantly test both France and Europe’s institutions. While he won't be on the ballot, intense dissatisfaction with Macron and the center may drag any candidates associated with them down. France’s presidential election promises to be one of the most closely watched and significant elections in the near future.

Recent results in the UK may be the greatest example of an observable anti-incumbent, anti-traditional political party trend. This month’s local elections left the UK’s traditionally dominant parties reeling, with both Labour and Conservative parties losing significant ground to the Greens, the Liberal Democrats, and most concerningly, far-right Reform. Labour lost over half of its local council seats, while Reform has largely displaced Labour in historic working-class strongholds [12]. This devastating result has prompted widespread calls for Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer to resign, and recent polling currently holds Reform at 26% with both Labour and Conservatives at 17% [13]. Starmer and Labour were carried to a landslide victory on the back of years of Conservative mismanagement, a poor economic situation, and a general anti-incumbency mood. Now, internal scandal and a perceived lack of focus may see Labour removed from power by the very same conditions that allowed the party to achieve it. While the UK is not required to have general elections until 2029, these local results indicate a lasting fracture of the power of Britain’s traditionally dominant parties, reflecting a broader trend of dissatisfaction with the persisting economic malaise and the status quo.

A larger trend?

While Orbán’s defeat is still fresh, and while it remains to be seen if the far-right outside of Hungary experiences a general decline, early indicators signal the far-right may be more resilient than many would hope. The fall of Orbán may simply be the result of failed governance, economic dissatisfaction, and a general distaste for incumbents regardless of ideology. As shown by recent results and polling throughout Europe, the general anti-incumbency trend has endured since the pandemic, as widespread disillusionment and poor economic conditions persist. It is entirely possible that, upon winning power, Europe’s other far-right parties would experience a similar decline as Orbán, but for now they largely remain on the rise. However, the significance of Orbán’s defeat should not be understated. While it may not bring about an immediate decline in the far-right, the fall of such a prominent figure of the far-right internationale is an important symbolic defeat that leaves Hungary better off and deprives the far-right of a powerful ally in Europe, weakening the credibility of the illiberal playbook. However, it may still be too early to declare the far-right on the run.