Widely considered one of the greatest third-wave democratic successes, South Korea has recently come under intense international scrutiny following the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk Yeol. Though shocking, Yoon’s declaration of martial law in December 2024 is merely a symptom of longstanding South Korean political corruption, marked by impeachments, incarcerations, coups, and suicides. The country’s fraught history reveals structural entanglements between South Korea’s executive branch and private economic powers known as chaebols—chae meaning wealth, bol meaning clique or clan. These mega-conglomerates provide economic support to the government in return for protection from competition and public scrutiny. The symbiotic relationship between chaebols and the South Korean government has driven the country’s remarkable economic growth since the 1960s and its democratic transition in the 1980s, making the country’s history, economy, and political system inseparable from the large conglomerates [1]. 

South Korea’s political history and Yoon’s recent impeachment highlight deep structural flaws in the country’s democratic system. These issues have only intensified as a result of increased political polarization, indecisive foreign policy, and growing domestic dissatisfaction with both the government and the economy. As a result, South Korea’s legitimacy and functionality have suffered both domestically and overseas. From this, a broader question emerges: what sets a modern democracy up for success? And what sets it up to fail?

The History of South Korean Democratization and the Rise of Chaebols 

Assessing the development of South Korea’s economic and political systems is crucial to understanding the country’s current state and its future as a modern democracy. South Korea first began its democratic transition in 1948, developing a constitution and establishing itself as a liberal democracy before subsequent authoritarian regimes hindered further democratization. The next four decades were interspersed with movements such as the April 19th Revolution of the 1960s, the Gwangju riots of 1980, and the June uprising of 1987, milestones of resistance that set the stage for South Korea’s first democratic elections in December 1987. The country now stands as an example of a successful third-wave democracy, an era that saw the fall of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and other Asia-Pacific countries, such as the Philippines [2]. 

However, this success has been marred by the country’s history of political corruption, much of which originates with South Korea’s family-run chaebols. Having dominated the country’s economy since before its regime transition, these mega-conglomerates continue to hold incredible power over South Korean politics. Most chaebols originated after the period of Japanese occupation during World War II and experienced tremendous growth during post-Korean War reconstruction efforts. After receiving significant international aid beginning in 1953, the South Korean government funneled hundreds of millions of dollars into chaebols in an attempt to rebuild infrastructure and the economy in critical industries. The country was attempting to mimic the 1960s reconstruction and rapid industrialization of the “Asian Tigers”—Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore—in pursuit of becoming a self-reliant, secure power, not dependent on outside states for its security [3]. Under Park Chung-hee (1961 coup leader and president from 1963-1979), chaebols and the South Korean economy flourished side by side, solidifying the conglomerates in the country’s history and post-war prosperity [4]. 

In the wake of the Korean War, South Korea’s incredible growth continued to remain dependent on the economic benefits of corruption [5]. In most other regions, corruption is generally growth-reducing; this is much less true in East Asia, where collaboration between the government and chaebols allowed for effective policy creation and reduced transaction costs [6]. President Park’s deals with Korean capitalists provided chaebols with financial incentives for meeting government-mandated export benchmarks. In return, the President and his political supporters received kickbacks that financed election campaigns, bribed supporters, and lined their own pockets with billions of won, provided by and extorted from chaebols [7]. The bureaucracy and policy formation process remained separate from societal interests while still retaining close ties with businesses [8]. This loop of economic corruption was growth-enhancing and eventually spread to Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Thailand, which developed similar relationships with conglomerated firms [9]. 

Globally recognized brands like Samsung and Hyundai, having received support from the Korean government since the 1960s, are now pillars of the South Korean economy. Approximately forty mega-conglomerates fit under the definition of a chaebol, but the top five—Samsung, SK Hynix, Hyundai, LG, and Lotte—represent half of the South Korean stock market’s value. Samsung alone contributed to 23% of the country’s GDP in 2024 [10]. The domestic and overseas advancement of these companies, along with the success of South Korea’s globalization efforts within the past few decades, stands as proof of the chaebol system’s economic effectiveness. Mega-conglomerates established themselves as the backbone of the South Korean economy, and their ties with political leaders continued to deepen, setting the stage for instability, mistrust, and decades of presidential scandal. 

Symbiotic Corruption: Chaebols and Presidential Scandals 

The chaebol growth model, although incredibly successful in the decades following the Korean War, results in major drawbacks—the most pressing being its erosion of political legitimacy. Government-chaebol relations have led to ongoing political corruption, with politicians relying on the conglomerates for financial support during campaigns, presenting chaebol successes as national successes. In return, chaebols receive tax deductions, loans, and support for favorable legislation and policy. Over time, this model’s entrenchment in the country’s political system has resulted in the erosion of public trust and governmental legitimacy, hinting at democratic dysfunction. 

While the presidential-chaebol symbiosis has continued to flourish, South Korea’s overall economic growth has dwindled and voter dissatisfaction has risen. The country’s market growth in 2025 is expected to remain around 1.5%—a significant downturn from earlier predictions. In contrast, chaebols continue to expand overseas and invest in the US and other emerging markets. In 2018, chaebols held 77% of the country’s market capital while employing 12% of South Korea’s workers, while non-chaebol firms held around 23% of capital but employed 88% of workers [11]. Public dissatisfaction with the status quo only worsened after President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) committed suicide in 2009 in response to bribery charge investigations [12]. 

Tensions peaked in 2016-2017, culminating in President Park Geun-hye’s involvement in an extensive corruption scandal and her subsequent impeachment and imprisonment [13]. In October 2016, it was revealed that Park’s close relationship with Choi Soon-sil, the daughter of a pseudo-Christian cult leader, allowed Choi to pressure Samsung and other mega-conglomerates into donating millions of dollars to the non-profits that she controlled [14]. This scandal prompted mass protests across the country, calling for Park’s impeachment and fueling the public’s already-simmering discontent against the government, political elite, and chaebols. Choi was sentenced to 20 years for abuse of power, bribery, and interference in government business, while Park was charged with bribery, abusing state power, and leaking state secrets. Park was impeached shortly after in March 2017. Lee Jae-yong, Samsung’s executive chairman, was also sentenced to five years for bribery and embezzlement, though he denied approving the payments or making donations in return for government favors [15]. 

Corruption didn’t stop there. Five years after his term in office, Lee Myung-bak, Park’s predecessor, was indicted and sentenced to 17 years in prison for embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of power in 2018. Investigations centered on allegations concerning campaign corruption, where it was found that Lee had accepted $5.4 million in bribes from Samsung in exchange for granting a presidential pardon to Samsung’s chairman, who had been convicted of tax fraud. He was also found guilty of accepting enormous sums of money from the CEO of Woori Financial Group—a state-financed company—for aiding in their appointment to the position [16]. 

Consequently, ex-President Yoon’s declaration of martial law in December 2024 is just the most recent example of South Korean executive overreach—a desperate attempt to shield himself from looming corruption investigations and public fallout, and merely the latest in a long list of presidential scandals. Coming off a parliamentary loss, already unpopular, and facing multiple corruption allegations, Yoon’s authority was deteriorating. Citing alleged subversive activities and impeachment proceedings, as well as the interference of “North Korean anti-state forces,” Yoon declared a national emergency and attempted to impose martial law [17]. This resulted in immediate public pushback, and the National Assembly unanimously voted to lift the declaration within six hours of Yoon’s televised national address, despite efforts by the Republic of Korea Army Special Forces to prevent the vote [18]. Yoon was subsequently indicted for leading an insurrection, becoming South Korea’s first sitting president to be arrested and indicted. The lack of institutional safeguards around the country’s executive, fueled by private sector influence, has led to governance being turned into a method of elite self-preservation, undermining transparency and representation—key principles within a democratic state. 

Global and Domestic Implications 

Roh, Park, Lee, and Yoon’s presidential scandals stand as major crises symptomatic of South Korea’s democratic shortcomings. South Korea’s authoritarian history has resulted in a top-down democratic system, in which the government operates under a singular, powerful executive. The president remains in command of the National Assembly, which yields to their authority concerning legislation, policy execution, appointments, and institutions such as South Korea’s national security agencies and public prosecution office. The Assembly’s rush to overthrow Yoon’s declaration was still dependent on the president holding to the ruling [19]. 

Despite the executive’s advantage, Korean presidents’ struggle for control against the parliament is constant and persistent. Situations in which they lose the parliamentary majority often compel them to circumvent the National Assembly, stretching executive powers in an attempt to evade a “lame duck” five-year term. This cycle leads to ongoing tension between executive and parliamentary authority and has resulted in presidents abusing government-chaebol relationships, providing the mega-conglomerates policy support, loans, subsidies, and tax incentives in return for economic favors.   

Park Geun-hye’s scandal is the clearest example of this situation: Park’s approval ratings had plummeted from 63% in 2013 to 30% by early 2015 as a result of public disapproval for her administration’s handling of the Sewol ferry disaster and other internal disputes, and she was widely considered a “lame duck” even before the corruption scandal emerged [20]. Park entered the election in 2012 with promises to restrain the chaebol, but her relationship with Choi said otherwise. When the details of their friendship came to light, crowds ranging from 500,000 to 1.5 million South Korean citizens gathered to demand she be ousted. 

The implications of the country’s pervasive presidential corruption extend beyond the legal realm, affecting nearly every facet of South Korean society. Politically, corruption scandals foster distrust in political institutions and worsen ideological polarization; South Korea’s two dominant parties have increasingly relied on provoking hostility to garner public support, and scandals only fuel the animosity and worsen in-and-outgroup mentalities. Internal policymaking is hampered by accusations of illegitimacy, and polarization has led to deep public dissatisfaction with each new elected president. On an international scale, corruption reduces South Korea’s credibility and affects its diplomatic relations. After Park Geun-Hye’s impeachment, a major concern was the stability of South Korean-US diplomacy, a relation of crucial importance due to North Korea’s proximity [21]. Domestically, challenges like the country’s plummeting birth rate and sky-high housing prices have led to an increase in public cynicism, with citizens increasingly viewing the government as self-serving, corrupt, and unresponsive. This institutional distrust hampers the government’s ability to address domestic challenges, creating a system in which both quality of life and disillusionment continue to worsen and democratic legitimacy falters. 

Democratic Resilience 

But just as these presidential scandals exist as a stark reminder of South Korea’s democratic failings, they simultaneously stand as examples of the country’s democratic successes. The pushback by citizens and the National Assembly against past corruption, as well as Yoon’s more recent declaration, demonstrates the resilience of the country's democratic process. South Korean citizens and institutions have demonstrated that they are able and willing to hold their leaders accountable, despite the disproportionate power of the country’s executive. Yoon pushed the envelope of presidential power from the beginning of his term, from conducting raids on journalists’ homes to gagging and forcibly removing a student protesting government budget cuts to scientific research. However, he crossed a line with the declaration of martial law. The response from citizens was immediate, and the support provided by South Korea’s democratic institutions enabled an intense and efficient pushback against government repression that wasn’t possible during the protests of the 1950s and 80s. 

A major democratic victory, the response to Yoon’s attempted coup demonstrated the maturity of the South Korean democracy—both the civilians and the institutions—which were able to overcome ideological polarization to unanimously override the declaration [22]. Yoon’s impeachment, as well as Park’s impeachment in 2017, signal to both South Korea and the rest of the world that the country’s democracy is not fragile. Despite executive failures or governmental corruption, the people, alongside the institutions built throughout the country’s history, will continue to shed blood, sweat, and tears in their fight for democracy—a fight that has occurred from the revolutions of the 50s and 60s to the protests and impeachments of the 2010s—and one that the people of South Korea will continue until its decisive resolution. 

Conclusion: A Broader Look at Modern Democracies

This look at South Korean democracy—a country with an incredibly advanced economy, intertwined with corruption and a history of executive overreach—raises the question: what separates a successful modern democracy from an unsuccessful one? Countries undergoing regime transition, attempting to quickly democratize without strong institutional foundations, are especially vulnerable to destabilization, nationalism, and internal and external conflict [23]. South Korea has managed to avoid many of these potential hazards, in part due to the country’s normalization of legitimate, effective protest culture and the creation of legal processes for executive impeachment and removal. As a result, it appears that the long-term success of a modern democracy seems to depend not just on elections or constitutions, but on the strength of its institutions: effective and independent branches of government that, alongside an engaged society, can place constraints on leaders and maintain stability through political turnover or crises. South Korean presidents have been able to overstep, but only temporarily, before being reined in by civilian mobilization or institutional restraints (as in the case of ex-President Yoon). It has been through the continuous, step-by-step development of South Korean democracy and the maintenance of institutional restraints that South Korea has remained relatively stable, despite its many scandals. Without these checks, the system may have quickly regressed. 

As the country continues to progress, there is hope that the democratic growth demonstrated by its citizens and institutions will lead to effective anti-corruption policy, which will lead to a more mature democracy, and so on, in a cyclical cycle of growth. South Korea is both cautionary and hopeful, demonstrating that despite chaebol corruption and executive overreach, it can remain committed to its democratic course—but only as long as its people and institutions remain committed to upholding accountability.