Extreme climatic events have long been a defining feature of the Sahel region of Africa. In the past century alone, Sahelian nations—comprising much of Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad, and Nigeria—have experienced droughts and famines, killing 100,000 civilians just in the 1970s [1]. While horrifying, there is another cause for international concern regarding the Sahel that has not received adequate attention and care. In the last 15 years, transnational terrorism in the Sahel has skyrocketed. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel is now conclusively the “epicenter for international terrorism” and accounts for nearly 4,000 deaths in 2023 [2,3]. Despite the current prevalence of terrorism in the region, Sahelian terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. What accounts for this concerning rise in terrorist violence?

This article will argue that climate-related migration fuels terrorist violence in the Sahel by embittering pastoralist communities towards sovereign Sahelian governments. Not only have international efforts thus far been ineffective but, in some cases, they have heightened existing terrorist violence in the region.

Extreme Climatic Events in the Sahel

Instances of famine incited by drought in the Sahel can be observed in the 1910s, 1940s, 1960s, and 1980s [4]. More recently, Niger experienced an outbreak of cholera, a waterborne disease, after flooding inundated much of the West African country. During the outbreak, 110 Nigeriens died as poor public sanitation and hygiene practices facilitated the spread of the disease [5].

However, the most destructive climate event in the Sahel occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. During this time, the Sahel experienced one of the worst droughts in recorded history as cumulative rainfall decreased by approximately 30% relative to the pre-drought period, leading to profound regional famine [6]. Over 100,000 perished, and thousands more fled from their ancestral homeland. 

According to Folland, Palmer, and Parker (1980), the instigating factor behind Sahelian droughts is changes in the gradient sea temperatures in the Northern and Southern hemispheres [7]. When Northern hemispheric sea water cools relative to Southern hemispheric seawater, drought ensues in much of the Sahel, as rain belts typically attract comparatively warmer oceanic temperatures. Presently, it is unclear whether climate change may exacerbate drought conditions through sea temperature changes in the Sahel. However, researchers do speculate that climate change may intensify weather conditions in the region.
 

Terrorism in the Sahel

According to the Global Terrorism Index, while Sahelian nations have experienced terrorist activity in the past, prior attacks were relatively isolated incidents in 2015 [8]. However, in 2023, Sahelian nations were among the most affected by terrorism in the world [9]. Burkina Faso ranked first, Mali ranked third, Nigeria ranked eighth, and Niger ranked tenth. Out of the ten most deadly terrorist attacks that year, seven took place in Sahelian nations, with Burkina Faso alone accounting for four such attacks.

These attacks were perpetrated by three prominent jihadist terrorist organizations: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State (IS) [10]. Of the aforementioned terrorist groups operating in the Sahel, JNIM has been the most violent. JNIM attacks account for 64 percent of total terrorist attacks in the Sahel region in 2023, which have resulted in nearly 1,100 deaths [11]. While the motivations behind joining such organizations are well-documented, existing literature has not examined the effect of climate-related migration on recruitment efforts in the region. 

Terrorism and Climate Events in the Sahel

During the 1970 to 1989 Sahelian drought, the Tuareg ethnic group from Mali emigrated to Libya to escape regional drought, where many became soldiers for the authoritarian Qaddaffi regime [12]. However, the Tuareg returned to Mali upon U.N. intervention and the killing of Qaddafi in 2011. Inspired by Qaddafi’s aspirations of forming a united North African Muslim State, some Tuareg went on to become members of Sahelian terrorist organizations. A notable example is Iyad Ag Ghaly, a former Tuareg rebel commander, who founded Ansar Dine: a terrorist organization dedicated to forming an absolute sharia in Mali. Ansar Dine later consolidated into JNIM along with several other Al-Qaeda auxiliary groups [13].

The current literature that examines the connection between climate migration and terrorism is limited to rural-urban migration within a particular nation. In Syria, rural populations migrated to cities because of widespread drought. Schon and Nemeth suggest a large concentration of economically destitute migrants formed a large constituency in the 2011 Syrian protests, which later resulted in a full-blown civil war [14]. 

Researchers posit that the fall of the Qaddafi regime and the Tuareg’s relationship to it is a major instigating factor of terrorism in the region. When Tuareg soldiers returned to Mali, they brought firearms and ammunition to mount a rebellion in the region [15]. As a result of fairly porous borders and weak national governments, Tuareg fighters rapidly seized control of vast swaths of Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger. This phenomenon has been further compounded by deepening poverty and military intervention.

In this respect, the Tuareg’s migration to Libya paved the way for the rise of terrorist violence in the Sahel region. These peoples migrated and eventually joined forces with an authoritarian regime dedicated to extremist jihadist ideologies because of the debilitating 1970-1989 drought. 

Existing Solutions to Combat Climate Migration in the Sahel

Currently, the most prominent program dedicated to addressing climate migration—and more broadly, climate change—in the Sahel is the Great Green Wall (G.G.W.) initiative. Launched in 2007 and spearheaded by the UN, G.G.W. intended to revitalize desertified land in the Sahel by planting a wall of trees spanning from Senegal in the west to Djibouti in the east. Slated to be completed by 2030, the UN boasted the Great Green Wall would be a “new world wonder" [16].

However, the initial goal of the program has changed since the program’s inception. According to the Smithsonian Magazine, the program was underfunded, which led to the deaths of thousands of trees planted through the program. Additionally, portions of the “wall” lacked the resources or labor necessary to ensure the trees’ survival. Dennis Garrity, an agroforestry expert with the World Agroforestry Effort, even went so far as to say that the initial goals of G.G.W. were foolish and an ineffective means of countering climate-related migration [17].

Additionally, other programs in the Sahel meant to prevent desertification and extreme climatic events have instead further marginalized pastoralist communities across the region. According to Benjaminsen and Ba, a substantial portion of Mali’s pastoralist community has joined anti-government jihadist terrorist organizations because of the government’s draconian climate-related measures [18]. In 1982, the government agreed to implement a structural adjustment program that expanded the number of members of the country’s Water and Forest Service. However, these officials often imposed steep fines on pastoralist communities for petty offenses and led pastoralists to believe that members of the Malian government were “money-grabbers.” In this respect, existing programs and mechanisms to address desertification and other climate-induced issues have been ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. Additionally, these programs have embittered Sahelian citizens towards their respective governments and, ultimately, paved a path for increased recruitment efforts in Sahelian terrorist groups.

Conclusion

While it is unclear how climate change may affect climate events in the Sahel, the Sahel region has experienced more severe climate events relative to the rest of the world. These climate events have not only led to climate-related migration, but to a rise in transnational terrorism in much of the central Sahel. Specifically, climate-related migration forced the Tuareg to leave their ancestral homeland and eventually become soldiers for the Qaddafi regime in Libya. This made the spread of transnational terrorism inevitable when the UN toppled the Qaddafi regime in 2011 and the Tuareg returned to Mali with military training and weapons. Additionally, existing mechanisms to prevent drought have not only failed to produce meaningful results, but also further galvanized local communities to join terrorist groups because of anti-government sentiments.