Revisiting Hamas' October 7th Attacks

Kavin Ganesan, Nov 30, 2024
feature-top

A year after the October 7th Hamas-led attack on Israel, the discourse surrounding Israel and Gaza remains deeply polarized. The war against Hamas has left millions displaced and tens of thousands dead [1]. As news coverage shifts towards escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, one critical question has been largely overlooked: Why did Hamas attack Israel in the first place? The current media narrative surrounding the attack is fundamentally flawed. Hamas’s actions are not driven by blind hatred or genocidal fanaticism—instead, it is a calculated move, strategically planned to accomplish Hamas’ goals. 

 

Israel’s security policy regards the very existence of a Palestinian state as an existential threat [2]. In response, Hamas aims to convince Israel that a one-state solution—where Israel maintains control over all territories—would be far more deadly than a two-state solution. To achieve this, Hamas inflicts as much humanitarian cost as possible on Israel. While morally reprehensible, this strategy is a calculated effort to pressure Israel into negotiations. The devastation Hamas inflicted on October 7th was intended to escalate the costs of Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories. By increasing these costs, Hamas hopes to force Israel to abandon its security doctrine.

 

The Israeli government, particularly under the leadership of the Likud Party, operates under a doctrine of offensive realism. This doctrine holds that security is best ensured by maximizing power and eliminating potential threats. The Likud Party’s charter explicitly declares, "Between the Sea and the Jordan, there will only be Israeli sovereignty. [3]" This is not empty rhetoric—it reflects a policy deeply embedded in the Israeli administration’s approach to the Palestinian issue. 

 

Following the Second Intifada, Likud leaders constantly argued that the existence of a Palestinian state would pose a perpetual security threat. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that the creation of a Palestinian state would "endanger the state of Israel [4]." Leaders have consistently pushed the narrative to the Israeli public that the only way to ensure true security for Israel is by annexing all land west of the Jordan River.

 

Hamas, on the other hand, views the situation differently. For them, the establishment of a Palestinian state is non-negotiable. Yet, they understand that the Israeli government considers any form of Palestinian statehood unacceptable. As a result, Hamas seeks to prove that the alternative—a one-state Israel that continues to deny Palestinian sovereignty—would be far worse for Israel. They aim to make life so unbearable through violence and terrorism that Israel will question the ‘security’ narrative that motivates their one-state stance. While their tactics, as seen on October 7th, are morally reprehensible from a humanitarian perspective, Hamas views them as a strategic necessity in the face of Israel’s efforts to prevent the establishment of any Palestinian state.

 

Hamas’ strategy includes targeting the Israeli public to undermine confidence in Netanyahu’s security policies. Since the war began, Netanyahu’s approval rating has declined significantly, tarnishing Likud’s promise of bringing lasting security to Israel [5]. Hamas hopes that Likud’s offensive realist security doctrine will end under a new administration, which may be more amenable to international pressures for Palestinian statehood.

 

Furthermore, the viewpoint that Hamas is a radical militant group with a non-negotiable stance on Israel’s destruction is oversimplified and inaccurate. In its 2017 charter, Hamas demonstrated pragmatism and a willingness to compromise by distinguishing between opposition to Zionism and opposition to Jews. The document rejects anti-semitism, stating that their conflict is “with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion [7].” This distinction represents a pragmatic shift away from targeting Jews based on their identity. The document even suggests acceptance of a Palestinian state based on the pre-1967, internationally recognized borders with East Jerusalem as the capital. This proposal yields 78 percent of historic Palestine to the State of Israel, with the remaining 22 percent—the West Bank and Gaza Strip—forming the State of Palestine. 

 

However, the international community largely disregards these shifts, as the charter continues to justify violence as a legitimate form of resistance to occupation under international law. This position prevents Hamas from being recognized as a legitimate political entity on the global stage. The Quartet (comprising the United Nations, United States, European Union, and Russia) maintains that renouncing violence is a precondition for peace talks, even though Israel has not been held to the same standard.

 

In essence, the media’s portrayal of Hamas has fostered significant misconceptions about the group’s motives and strategy. Rather than viewing Hamas solely as a radical terrorist organization devoid of reason, it should be understood as a strategic rebel group using destructive and violent methods to achieve its objectives.

 

Still, some argue that Hamas’s 2017 Charter was merely a public relations stunt and that Hamas would never engage in negotiations, even if invited. Netanyahu’s spokesperson dismissed the charter as an attempt to “fool the world,” and Netanyahu himself famously tossed the policy paper into a trash can on video [8,9]. In that case, it might be strategically prudent for Israel to call Hamas’s bluff. If Israel is confident that Hamas would reject a return to internationally recognized borders—despite its claims in the charter—then calling the bluff could enable Israel to reclaim the moral high ground as the sole peace-seeking actor in the conflict.

 

Furthermore, the charter—while advocating for a return to pre-1967 borders—frames a two-state solution based on those borders as merely a preliminary step toward the total liberation of Palestine [13]. Israeli leadership has seized on this point to argue that the updated charter does not alter Hamas’s ultimate objective, which they claim remains the destruction of Israel. However, Hamas has expressed willingness to disarm in exchange for a return to the internationally recognized borders [14]. Disarmament would significantly diminish Hamas’s military capabilities, making it difficult to launch the kind of destructive campaign against Israel that Netanyahu asserts they would pursue.

 

Nevertheless, Israeli leadership argues that the topography of the West Bank could enable Palestinians to launch rockets capable of reaching Tel Aviv. However, if a future Palestinian state were to disarm—similar to the current Palestinian National Authority, which lacks a standing army—couldn’t the IDF justifiably intervene to neutralize such threats? This raises fundamental questions about the credibility of Netanyahu’s security doctrine—questions the Israeli electorate must begin to ask.

 

Many argue that negotiating with Hamas would embolden and legitimize terrorist groups, undermining the long-standing norm against such engagements. However, there is substantial precedent for Israel and other countries to pursue this strategy. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) offers the most notable example: the organization laid down arms in exchange for a commitment to negotiate a Palestinian state [10]. Although this peace process ultimately failed, with both sides blaming each other, it demonstrates that negotiation with armed groups is not unprecedented. In fact, negotiation is a common approach to ending insurgencies and fostering lasting peace. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Islamic Salvation Front (F.I.S.) in Algeria are further examples where state actors negotiated with armed groups to successfully resolve conflicts and end violence [11].

 

While many in the West oppose negotiating with terrorists due to their violent methods, it is worth remembering that South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) was once designated a terrorist organization during its struggle against Apartheid. Many of history’s most celebrated liberation movements were, in their time, branded as acts of terrorism. As a result, some scholars argue that the term ‘terrorism’ is a selective label, applied only to enemies of those using it, rather than reflecting the actual brutality of their methods [12]. These scholars contend that Hamas’s objectives should be judged not by their destructive methods, but by the justness of the cause they claim to fight for.

 

In conclusion, the path Israel is on is driven by the deluded belief that Palestinian statehood is an existential threat. Hamas’ strategy, though deeply flawed and morally abhorrent, highlights the urgent need for a shift in Israel’s approach to the conflict. The October 7th attacks proved that Likud’s one-state security doctrine is highly counterproductive, turning the international community and the Israeli electorate against Netanyahu. In the future, we must recognize the nuanced agenda of Palestinian militant groups, like Hamas, and pressure all actors to institute a more mindful security policy. Only by doing so can there be hope for a lasting peace, where both Israelis and Palestinians can coexist in security and sovereignty.


Sources

[1] MoH Gaza. “Data on Casualties.” Office for the Coordination on Humanitarian Affairs. November 1st, 2024. https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties

[2] Knesset. "Press Release: Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the Knesset Plenum on Rejection of Palestinian Statehood." Knesset, February 20th, 2024. https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/news/pressreleases/pages/press200224r.aspx

[3] Likud Party. "Original Party Platform of the Likud Party." Jewish Virtual Library. October 30th, 2023. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/original-party-platform-of-the-likud-party

[4] The Associated Press. "Netanyahu Says He Told U.S. That He Opposes Palestinian State in Any Postwar Scenario." NPR. January 19th, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/01/19/1225574007/netanyahu-says-he-told-u-s-that-he-opposes-palestinian-state-in-any-postwar-scen

[5] Times of Israel Staff. "Poll: Netanyahu's Job Approval Rating at 32%, Gantz Only Slightly Higher at 35%." The Times of Israel. October 30th, 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/poll-netanyahus-job-approval-rating-at-32-gantz-only-slightly-higher-at-35/

[6] Hamas. "A Document of General Principles and Policies." Hamas. May 10th, 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170510123932/http://hamas.ps/en/post/678/

[7] Hamas. "A Document of General Principles and Policies." May 10th, 2017.

[8] Al Jazeera. "Hamas Accepts Palestinian State with 1967 Borders." Al Jazeera. May 2nd, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/2/hamas-accepts-palestinian-state-with-1967-borders

[9] Jerusalem Post Staff. "Netanyahu Tosses Hamas Policy Paper on Israel into Waste Bin." The Jerusalem Post. May 7th, 2017. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/netanyahu-tosses-hamas-policy-paper-on-israel-into-waste-bin-490098

[10] Sewell, Abby. "Hamas Official Says Group Would Lay Down Its Arms if an Independent Palestinian State Is Established." AP News, April 25, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438

[11] Zartman, I. William. "Negotiating with Terrorists." International Negotiation, vol. 8, no. 3, 2003. https://www.academia.edu/101014286/Negotiating_with_Terrorists

[12] Chomsky, Noam, and Andre Vltchek. Terrorism: How the West Created Terrorism. Pluto Press, 2013.

[13] Hamas. "A Document of General Principles and Policies." May 10th, 2017.

[14] Bauck, Petter, and Mohammed Omer, editors. The Oslo Accords: A Critical Assessment. American University in Cairo Press, 2017. https://academic.oup.com/cairo-scholarship-online/book/21343