On December 8, 2024, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies overthrew the regime of then-Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The regime change marked the end of forty-five years of repressive rule by the al-Assad family and fourteen years of civil war [1]. Assad was granted asylum in Russia, one of his key allies throughout the war [2]. His fall was met with great jubilation as thousands of political prisoners were released from regime jails and reunited with their families [3]. However, Syria remains economically fragile and deeply fractured, with concerns over its future governance and stability. Rebuilding efforts in the country will require the careful navigation of both internal power struggles and external geopolitical interests.

Syria’s demographic landscape and socioeconomic structure profoundly changed during the civil war. In 2009, 16 percent of Syrians lived under the international poverty line for low and middle-income countries of $3.65 per day. In 2022, 69 percent of the population lived under that threshold. Before the war, agriculture contributed to 22 percent of Syria’s GDP and employed nearly a quarter of the total workforce. Conflict and drought led to a sharp decline in wheat production, which fell by more than 50 percent between 2016 and 2018 compared to the annual averages in the early 2000s. Additionally, industrial employment was cut nearly in half between 2010 and 2022, and workers have shifted to more informal and unreliable service-based jobs, often in small family businesses [4]. 

The civil war is estimated to have caused over half a million casualties and displaced fourteen million people, both internally and internationally. In 2022, a third of Syrian households reported an absent member for conflict-related reasons [5]. The most notable population deficit due to war and migration has been in men aged 20 to 29. Many in this group sought to avoid mandatory conscription and find work abroad to send money home to their families. Reliance on money sent from family members abroad is significant, with 37 percent of Syrian households receiving international remittances in 2022, totaling 1.5 billion dollars in value [6].

Syria will need its people to return home to rebuild its economy, but forced deportations of Syrian refugees from host countries or an influx of people into Syria too quickly could have severe consequences for already strained resources and infrastructure. More than 300,000 people have reportedly returned to Syria from countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon since the fall of Assad, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)[7]. Four days after Assad’s fall, Prime Minister Najib Mikati of Lebanon called for Syrian refugees to return home, citing a strain on the country’s resources and labor market. Lebanon is home to two million refugees, which make up a third of its population. Turkey is home to the most Syrian refugees, with 2.8 million Syrians living in the country, which is an important consideration in diplomatic relations between the two countries [8]. 

There are growing concerns about potential forced expulsions from European nations such as Germany, which had previously provided asylum to close to a million Syrian refugees [9]. On December 9, the day after Assad fell, Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) put all asylum applications from Syrian nationals on hold [10]. Belgium, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Austria promptly followed [11]. The far-right German party AFD (Alternative for Germany), which has been rising in the polls in recent months, often mentions terms such as “remigration”  in their rallies and advocates for sending refugees back to their home countries as part of their nationalistic ideology. In Austria, the government started offering a “return bonus” of a thousand euros to Syrian migrants wishing to return home [12]. The reinstatement of the people who return to Syria is an additional challenge the new government will need to plan for, especially as Syrians may face housing shortages and a lack of proper infrastructure. There have been several testimonials of people returning to Damascus only to find their old houses and neighborhoods had been destroyed throughout the conflict [13].

Syria’s new interim president and HTS leader, Ahmed al-Shara, must prove his legitimacy internationally and establish diplomatic relations post-Assad.  HTS was initially set up in 2011 under the name “Jahbat Al-Nusra” as a direct affiliate of al-Qaeda. The group broke off in 2016, and HTS was formed in 2017. That same year, they controversially supported letting Turkish troops into the northwestern area of Idlib as part of the Astana peace talks between Iran, Russia, and Turkey that worked toward a ceasefire in the region. HTS has also worked to suppress Hurras al-Deen, one of the hardline branches of Al-Qaeda in Syria. Still, HTS remains a designated terrorist organization on official lists from the UN Security Council, Turkey, the United States, and numerous other countries [14].

Russia and Iran played a crucial role in sustaining Assad’s regime throughout the Syrian Civil War. Both countries evacuated their embassies and troops in Syria and prompted their citizens to leave the country following Assad’s fall [15]. In 2015, the Russian military intervened on behalf of Assad, launching airstrikes against rebel-held territories. In September 2024, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimated that more than 21,000 people, including 8,700 civilians, had been killed in Russian military operations. In Syria, Moscow maintained a naval base in Tartus, its only access to the Mediterranean, and an Air Base in Hmeimim, also close to the coast. Russia’s ability to maintain its involvement in Syria dwindled as its geopolitical priorities shifted, especially with the war in Ukraine [16]. The Kremlin now faces a different challenge: preserving its interests in Syria under a new leadership that may not be as compliant as Assad once was.

Regarding Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had trained and supplied Assad’s Syrian forces for over a decade.  Iran’s strategic objective in Syria is to secure a land corridor for the militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintain its influence in the Levant [17]. The collapse of the Assad regime disrupts Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah logistically, as the land route that once allowed the transfer of weapons and supplies is now compromised. It is worth noting that the HTS rebels are Sunni Islamists, whereas Iran is a Shia Muslim majority country. More importantly, al-Assad had called upon Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, backed by Iran, to support his Syrian national army in fighting rebel groups during the civil war. For these two reasons, Syrian rebel groups in power are likely to block Iranian influence and military movements [18]. Additionally, Israel has intensified its strikes on Iranian missile facilities in Syria, further weakening Tehran’s ability to supply Hezbollah [19].

The new political situation has renewed tensions between Syria’s Kurdish minority and Turkey. The U.S.-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which played a pivotal role in defeating ISIS, now face pressure from Turkey and Syria’s interim government to disarm [20]. Turkey has long considered the SDF to be linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it classifies as a terrorist organization. With Assad gone, Turkish-backed forces have launched a series of attacks on SDF-held areas, further complicating Syria’s newfound and fragile peace. The U.S. has struggled to balance its support for Kurdish forces with its diplomatic relationship with Turkey, a NATO ally. The lack of a clear U.S. commitment has left Kurdish leaders feeling increasingly vulnerable. The commander of Kurdish forces, General Mazlum Kobani, accused the U.S. of abandoning its Kurdish allies to maintain diplomatic relations with Turkey. Kobani has warned that dwindling U.S. support of Kurd troops means areas previously liberated from ISIS are vulnerable to a resurgence [21]. Additionally, Syria’s interim president, HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in February to discuss strengthening ties between the two countries. In the meeting, Al-Shara told Erdogan he wanted to establish a shared strategy for dealing with the U.S.-backed Kurdish-led militias in Northeastern Syria, which he qualified as a “security threat” [22]. In June 2023, Turkey moved to expel Syrian refugees from its territory as Erdogan pledged to return one million of the estimated 3.6 million Syrians in the country in an attempt to restore diplomatic relations with Assad. It could be expected that HTS would take an anti-Kurdish stance to avoid Turkey expelling the 2.8 million Syrians who currently live there before Syria’s infrastructure is ready [23].

Reintegration into the global economy will be a key part of Syrian recovery. On February 24, 2025, the European Union (EU) lifted sanctions on the Syrian energy sector (oil, gas, and electricity) and transport sectors, including aviation. Five Syrian banks and Syrian Arab airlines were removed from the list of entities subject to funding freezes. For example, funds will now be allowed to flow back into the Syrian Central Bank [24]. Syria possesses significant oil and natural gas reserves. As new markets open up, the potential reopening of oil exports could provide a crucial revenue stream for rebuilding infrastructure. In 2010, oil and gas exports represented 20 percent of the government’s revenue. As the war broke out and production declined, the two state-owned refineries were damaged, and Syria went from an exporter to a net importer of oil in 2012 [25]. Restarting oil exportation will be geopolitically delicate as Kurdish forces occupy the northeast, where many of these fields are located [26]. For a steady recovery, Syria must diversify its economy, restore agricultural production, rebuild irrigation systems, and ensure food security to prevent further displacement. 

The international community remains divided on whether to engage with HTS-led authorities, given their historical ties to extremist networks. However, U.S. officials said HTS had shown pragmatism in their governance over the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria and had been prompt in helping civilians in areas they had taken over from the regime [27]. The EU lifting sanctions is another reason to be optimistic about international actors' willingness to engage with HTS. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which had diplomatic relations with the Assad regime, have also shown that they are willing to work with HTS. The new Syrian foreign minister, Asa’d al-Shibani, visited both countries. All three parties share a similar interest in maintaining stability in the region and weakening Iranian influence in the Levant [28]. With effective domestic policies to revitalize agriculture, industry, and oil production, a managed return of migrants, and sustained humanitarian aid and foreign investment, Syria can be on a path to recovery.