In recent years, the world has witnessed what Professor Rob Ford of the University of Manchester called “the greatest wave of anti-incumbent voting ever seen” [1]. In 2024, voters turned away incumbent parties in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Japan, South Africa, and South Korea [2]. Despite some governments changing from right-wing to left-wing, more often than not, these elections empowered the right or saw far-right parties experience historically high levels of turnout, such as in Germany, France, and Austria [3]. This sweeping trend of anti-incumbency has led observers to theorize about the roots of worldwide discontent as well as the secrets of the successful campaigns of those who bucked the trend. Rob Ford, professor of political science at the University of Manchester, has pointed to inflation as the major driver of the anti-incumbency wave [4]. Following the COVID-19 Pandemic, inflation has been on the rise across the globe as consumer demand rebounded before global supply chains could catch up [5]. Consequently, people worldwide have been reporting increasingly stark anti-establishment views, which have boosted the efficacy of populist, anti-elite movements. In a 2024 Pew Research survey across 24 countries, a median of 74 percent of respondents answered that elected officials “did not care what people like them think” [6]. 

In light of this global disaffection with the ruling classes, the emphatic endorsement of Morena, Mexico’s dominant left-wing party, after six years in power stands out. Claudia Sheinbaum, the mentee of former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), overwhelmingly won the election in June 2024 with 59 percent of the vote [7]. Sheinbaum benefited from the massive popularity of her predecessor who prioritized social programs for the poor and denounced elites both inside and outside the Mexican government. In addition to promising a continuation of these policies, Sheinbaum offered her credentials as the mayor of Mexico City, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning climate scientist, and the country’s potential first female president [8]. Overall, Sheinbaum’s staggering victory, which can be seen in large part as a referendum on AMLO’s popular presidency, demonstrates the effective potential for left-wing populism in an era where far-right parties appear to be globally ascendant. At the same time, AMLO’s consolidation of power, which Sheinbaum has continued so far, also lays bare the inherently destabilizing and anti-democratic dangers of populism.

Just as Joe Biden’s shortcomings were laid at the feet of Kamala Harris, AMLO’s consistent popularity set up Sheinbaum for her 2024 victory. AMLO’s legacy is multifaceted, marked by successes and failures of policy in national security, COVID-19 response, women’s rights, and environmental protection. However, two policies, economic justice and executive centralization, stand out as AMLO’s core programs. Economic justice is AMLO’s trademark issue as he referred to Mexico’s billionaire class as a mafia and promised to curb their power [9]. Furthermore, his top slogan throughout his campaign and administration was “for the good of all, first the poor” [10]. AMLO’s policies aimed to replicate the simplicity of this slogan with straightforward cash transfers and raises in the national minimum wage [11]. For instance, he replaced patchworks of conditional social programs with a flagship universal old age pension. These simple slogans and universalized programs gave AMLO’s messaging an effective clarity, even when the actual economic picture was more complicated. 

Despite these universal social programs and anti-elite posturing, during AMLO’s term less money went to Mexico’s poorest while the country’s wealthiest saw no increase in their taxes. According to the AP, even while several million citizens escaped poverty during AMLO’s time in office, “about 400,000 more Mexicans [lived] in extreme poverty” at the end of his term [12].  Even as social spending has risen in general, in a breakdown of social spending that divides Mexicans into ten categories of income, a smaller percentage is now allocated to the poorest category, decreasing from 19 to 6 percent in the first two years of AMLO’s presidency [13]. AMLO’s form of economic justice is also defined by how his social spending is funded. Rather than increase taxes on the rich, AMLO has tightened funding for healthcare and education, increased tax enforcement, and benefited from rising inflation alleviating debt burdens [14]. Therefore, despite AMLO’s rhetoric, these are far from ideal redistributive policies. By cutting targeted social programs to pay for universal ones and refusing to increase taxes on the wealthy, AMLO's policies leave much of Mexico’s concentrated wealth intact and neglect the nation’s poorest citizens. 

Despite the unevenness of his social safety net, raising millions of citizens out of poverty remains a laudable achievement, and, ultimately, AMLO’s messaging has been effective. Upon leaving office in September 2024, AMLO enjoyed an approval rating of 70 percent, with social programs and the economy ranking at the top of his policies in voter approval [15, 16]. Along with the tangible, although mixed, successes of his social programs, these approval ratings represent a victory of public relations as well. AMLO’s signature method of communication, which Sheinbaum has continued, is the mañanera—a daily press conference where he prides himself on speaking directly to the people [17]. AMLO’s method of talking directly to the people is not just an effective means of communication, but an explicit insult to Mexico’s institutional media. One journalist describes the seating arrangement of the mañaneras: “In the front rows would be bloggers, YouTubers, and the like. These were… ‘the blessed social media.’ In the back rows would be traditional journalists, belonging to ‘la prensa fifí’—‘the fancy press’...Those were López Obrador’s terms” [18]. A more extreme example of AMLO’s tumultuous relationship with the press was his doxxing of a New York Times journalist. During his mañanera, Obrador publicly read an email from Natalie Kitroeff, a journalist who requested a comment on an investigation into cartel donations to his campaign, including the public release of her personal phone number [19]. If the redistributive policies are the substance of left-wing populism, the mañaneras are the all-important form. Reaching out to the people directly, Obrador decries the media elites and buys himself credibility at their expense, taking away from the ability of the media to offer a check on presidential power. 

If populism can be understood as requiring the rhetorical construction of elite enemies to pit against the righteous masses, the media are not the only elites Obrador has railed against. AMLO has levied the same sorts of attacks against the Mexican government’s autonomous institutions, jeopardizing its liberal democracy. Mexico’s Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), an autonomous institution that safeguards free and fair elections, has been the victim of much of AMLO’s ire after suspending two Morena gubernatorial candidates for not submitting spending reports [20]. Dating back further, INE also certified the 2006 election, where Lopez Obrador lost by thin margins and alleged fraudulent voting occurred [21]. In response, AMLO first called for a constitutional amendment that would have replaced the INE with a new institution over which the executive branch would have greater influence. When this proposal failed to meet the threshold for a constitutional reform, he resorted to his “Plan B,” slashing the INE’s budget, hindering its ability to effectively monitor elections nationwide [22]. Seeking to subjugate one of the key institutions in Mexico’s liberal democracy under the executive is a dangerous sign of democratic backsliding. 

After the courts declared a portion of “Plan B” unconstitutional, AMLO doubled down on “Plan C,” which, in addition to the INE, takes aim at Mexico’s judiciary [23]. The reform would create a “supervisory” body for the judiciary and change judicial positions from being appointed to being elected. These measures would meaningfully restrict the independence of the judiciary and judges’ abilities to rule Morena's actions unconstitutional without being unseated. Both judicial and electoral reforms are part and parcel of populism, not just because of the need to single out and chastise “elites,” but because populism inherently demands decisive action. When citizens are disillusioned with the gridlock of liberal democracy, populism thrives by promising vigor and strength, plowing down any obstacles in its path. 

Although AMLO’s imminent position in Mexican politics had already set Claudia Sheinbaum up for success, she also benefited in the election from the ways in which she differs from AMLO. López Obrador governed with an antipathy towards feminist groups and was also criticized for disregarding the environment [24]. Sheinbaum both consciously advertised herself as running to be Mexico’s first woman president and comes from a background in environmental science [25]. The two have also displayed different temperaments, as can be seen in Sheinbaum’s repeated emphasis on keeping a “cool head” compared to AMLO’s more spiteful mañaneras [26].

Crucially, though, Sheinbaum has continued on the course of pushing through AMLO’s judicial reforms [27]. Accordingly, even as Sheinbaum enjoys a high voter approval rating and advocates for progressive change, it is worthwhile to scrutinize her position as the inheritor of AMLO’s legacy, especially in pushing through these structural reforms to Mexico’s liberal government. On one hand, the outcomes of AMLO’s redistributive policies have succeeded in lifting millions out of poverty. At the same time, his erosion of Mexico’s checks and balances enables the rise of despotism and threatens to destabilize the country for years to come.