Since its creation in 1993, the European Union (EU) has portrayed itself as a global leader in democracy, transparency, and human rights [1]. Yet, the Union’s position inside today’s deeply interconnected digital world is increasingly at odds with these values. Modern global networks, from financial markets to data routing systems, are dominated by a few powerful states that control critical nodes. This structure creates the principle of “weaponized interdependence” where these states at the center of global networks can use their wide reach to monitor, restrict, or exploit the information that flows through them [2]. The EU’s reliance on these networks exposes it to the “Panopticon Effect,” a condition where pervasive and sometimes invisible surveillance produces behavioral changes like self-censorship [3]. As long as the EU continues to depend on foreign technology, it will remain vulnerable to foreign observation, reduced autonomy, and a gradual erosion of democratic freedoms. 

The Panopticon Effect and the Legacy of Snowden

The concept of the Panopticon effect, theorized by French philosopher Michel Foucault, explains that society achieves order and conformity through the generalized belief that people are constantly under observation, leading people to discipline themselves. Although constant monitoring is not required to influence behavior, the mere possibility of being watched is enough to produce self-restraint, conformity, and the avoidance of dissident expression [4]. After Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosures revealed the true scale of United States surveillance programs, such as the ability for the National Security Agency and its allies to intercept communications in the form of emails, messages, photos, and browsing history, millions of people changed their online behavior [5]. These programs, notably XKeyscore, allowed American intelligence agencies to collect vast amounts of internet communications in real time and without prior authorization, essentially allowing for the complete monitoring of nearly everything a user did online [6]. People began avoiding specific searches, conversations, and websites out of fear that their activity could be flagged, tracked, or stored [7].

For Europeans, this fear operates on the larger geopolitical scale. The EU's physical and logical communications infrastructure routes large volumes of data through American tech giants, like Amazon Web Services and Microsoft [8]. Personal communications, but also sensitive corporate information, strategic government files, and intellectual property are all at risk [9]. Even if this monitoring may be legal in the United States, Europeans lack the protections that shield American citizens from federal surveillance [10]. For example, the controversial Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) actively allows the NSA to conduct targeted surveillance on non-citizens outside the U.S., using the compelled assistance of electronic communication service providers like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft [11]. As a result, the Panopticon Effect has created a background of caution that shapes the behavior of European individuals and institutions, reinforcing an imbalance of power that makes the EU vulnerable to global networks.

Dependence on Foreign Technology and Authoritarian Partnerships

Foreign technology strengthens European surveillance capabilities, but it also exposes how vulnerable the EU is to external influence. European states regularly depend on American, Chinese, and Israeli companies for their own monitoring systems [12]. 

Take Nuctech, a Chinese X-ray and security scanner manufacturer. Nuctech supplied scanning equipment to all but one EU member state, often in high-traffic locations like ports and airports [13]. These machines were used to scan everything from luggage to personnel. Concerns arose because of Nuctech’s close ties to the Chinese government, including opaque ownership structures, government subsidies, and legal obligations (eg. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law: requires that Chinese companies with overseas operations must surrender data to the state upon request) that may put the company’s data into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) hands [14]. After European officials warned of the possibility of security breaches, citing Nuctech’s ability to collect, transmit, or alter sensitive data, an airport in Poland moved to replace their technology with domestic alternatives [15]. 

This very reliance exemplifies the vulnerability that Europe faces. Although the EU relies on these companies for expanding its surveillance capacities, in doing so, they risk exposing sensitive information to foreign intelligence agencies. This vulnerability extends beyond China, involving other foreign firms, like U.S.-based Palantir Technologies and the Israeli NSO Group. Palantir triggers the 2024 U.S. Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, allowing the government to compel any domestic entity with access to security equipment to assist in data collection [16]. NSO Group is tied to the 2007 Israeli Defense Export Control Act, that treats security software as subject to state oversight and remote disconnection [17]. These frameworks grant the American and Israeli governments the legal and technical abilities to review European security systems, effectively turning security tools into observatory lenses that are, in all likelihood, actively utilized [18, 19, 20, 21].

However, the problem extends past security equipment. Major global technology companies like Microsoft and Amazon are headquartered in the United States, giving American authorities potential legal pathways, such as jurisdictional control allowing easy access to data, and the use of mass surveillance programs like PRISM to access data collected abroad [22]. Some countries rely on mandated company cooperation, like China [23]. This sensitive information includes personal communications from both government personnel and civilians and information pertaining to some of Europe's largest businesses [24]. The result is a geopolitical crisis, where countries like the United States enjoy privileged access to global information networks and can leverage its advantageous positions in diplomatic and strategic contexts [25, 26]. American officials may frequently criticize foreign authoritarian surveillance practices, but this dynamic places their commitment to democratic values in question.

Europe and the Panopticon Effect: Strategic Vulnerability and Erosion of Democracy

The Panopticon Effect relinquishes European political, technological, and security information to powerful external actors at the center of global networks. When a foreign state can discretely observe flows of communication and information, the EU falls victim to an unavoidable information asymmetry. As a result, Europe becomes vulnerable not only to direct surveillance, but also to the self-censorship and strategic caution that emerge when a political actor believes it is being watched. 

This effect also shapes European politics. As surveillance becomes increasingly normalized, both citizens and visitors adjust their behavior because they assume they are constantly being monitored. This self-censorship challenges core democratic principles because it discourages people from expressing dissent, searching for certain information, and participating in political activism out of fear of potential repercussions. Ultimately, this leads to large geopolitical impacts: the reinforcement of the dominant political narrative through silencing minority or dissenting views [27, 28].

The normalization of persistent surveillance also carries significant cultural consequences. A society that grows accustomed to constant observation becomes less democratic, less open, and less willing to tolerate political opposition [29, 30]. In such an environment, people feel compelled to restrain what they say or do online. 

Over time, expanded surveillance capabilities reinforce themselves, creating a harmful cycle that eventually comes in conflict with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: protections on individual privacy. The EU simply cannot continue to present itself as a defender of liberal democracy if daily life conditions individuals to monitor themselves, restrain their curiosity, and avoid political engagement.

Toward European Digital Sovereignty

Europe has begun developing partial responses to external digital influence, although none are sufficient on their own. Some EU states have moved to replace foreign technology with domestic alternatives, like the Polish airport’s removal of Nuctech scanners. Establishing independent European surveillance and intelligence systems would reduce vulnerability to foreign monitoring, yet these efforts would be costly and likely would not be fully effective. The United States already controls major parts of the global data environment, and attempts at full technological separation would create immediate setbacks that would impede the EU's competitiveness. 

Therefore, a more balanced strategy is required. The EU should strengthen data localization requirements and implement stricter transparency regulations for foreign manufacturers and information companies in order to prevent sensitive information from leaving European jurisdiction. In the past 10 years, the EU has pushed towards these goals; for example, the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) strengthened transparency requirements by mandating that all companies operating in the EU must clearly disclose how they process and transfer personal data [31]. The EU has also introduced laws like the Data Act, that protect against non-EU government access to non-personal data stored domestically [32]. The goal is not to fully withdraw from an interconnected digital world. Rather, the goal is to ensure that interdependence does not become a channel through which external powers can shape and harm European politics and culture.

The Panopticon Effect represents more than just a technical vulnerability. It is a structural challenge to the democratic character of the EU, one where it is necessary for the EU to rebalance its position within global networks, or it risks allowing its freedoms, autonomy, and political identity to be conditioned by foreign actors with greater influence.