Introduction

    After Donald Trump’s 2020 defeat and the Capitol insurrection that followed, it seemed likely that the Republican Party would turn to a new presidential candidate in 2024. Yet today, President Trump sits in the Oval Office for his second term. Numerous factors contributed to his political revival, but his campaign’s emotionally charged rhetoric was the most instrumental in his reelection. 

Since 2016, Trump has employed several strategies similar to those of former Alabama Governor George Wallace. In 1968, Wallace ran for president under the American Independent Party and won five Deep South states and roughly 13 percent of the popular vote [1]. As the Governor of Alabama, he was an ardent segregationist, infamously known for standing in the doorway of Foster Auditorium to prevent two African American students from enrolling at the University of Alabama [2]. In his 1968 campaign, Wallace took advantage of this politically divisive moment to stimulate fear and resentment, a tactic that would later become a hallmark of Trump’s campaign approach [3]. The emotionally charged, pseudo-populist strategies used by Wallace and Trump were key to their political ascensions, demonstrating the power of fear and performative rage during times of public distress and frustration. 

Pseudo-Populism 

Populism is a heavily debated term in modern politics. Generally speaking, populism is understood to be a political style in which a politician seeks to represent the common person against an elite class or an unjust state of affairs. By contrast, pseudo-populism is a strategy in which a politician employs  “for the people” rhetoric while their policies and intentions fail to reflect populist values, such as redistributing power to a broad public and implementing impactful reform. Instead, these policies often serve a narrow in-group or the politician's own authority.

One of the most notable pseudo-populists in U.S. history was President Andrew Jackson. Jackson presented himself as a humble, average American man, catapulting himself to a victory in 1828; however, when in office, he pursued top-down executive power and adhered to the spoils system, granting high-level Washington jobs to inexperienced loyalists [4]. While some argue that this practice expanded government access to outsiders and ordinary people, it functioned more as an apparatus to reward political allegiance and less as a systematic reform.

George Wallace can be considered a pseudo-populist because his rhetoric primarily functioned as a defense of segregation and white Southern identity, not the average person he claimed to represent. Trump’s pseudo-populism stems from similar causes as Jackson’s: appointing loyalists to government positions and centralizing power. Although their language evoked emotion and called upon populist sentiments, these factors dampened the credibility of their populism. However, the negative reception to their pseudo-populism did not tarnish their campaigns. Both Wallace and Trump used performative political rallies to strengthen their images as messengers of the people [5]. As a result, the personas they presented resonated with voters more than people’s concerns with their policy, resulting in further public frustration. In addition to positioning and promoting themselves as voices of the people, Wallace and Trump employed several effective strategies that leveraged widespread unrest as they rose to prominence.

“The Times They Are a-Changin’”

The 1960s was a decade of intense cultural, social, and political change. The era was ushered in by John F. Kennedy, a new young president who promised Americans a “New Frontier” of prosperity [6]. Within three years, Kennedy had led the country through an escalating Cold War with Russia and divisive civil rights legislation but had his presidency cut abruptly short after his assassination in Texas. His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, pursued civil rights action, initiated a war on poverty, and involved the U.S. in the most controversial war in American history. The Vietnam War sparked outrage and protest throughout the country, especially on college campuses [7]. Simultaneously, African American citizens protested for civil rights and frequently clashed with law enforcement in the South [8]. In 1968, some of these protests swelled into large urban uprisings after Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated [9]. On top of this political and societal chaos, the younger generation widely adopted psychedelic drugs, resulting in a cultural disconnect between adults and the youth [10]. This volatile instability tore at the American fabric and left many Americans disillusioned by the pace of change. In 1968, Wallace’s campaign anchored itself in the chaos of violence and protest. He offered an emotional escape from the time to those overwhelmed, especially white Southerners soured by civil rights, cultural shifts, and a perceived loss of control. 

A New Age of Anxiety

Although not as tumultuous as Wallace’s decade, the period of Trump’s ascent carried its own anxieties and fears. One of the biggest concerns was the economy, specifically the rising unemployment rate. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico was ratified in 1993 to establish a trilateral free trade bloc. Since NAFTA, an estimated 4.5 million American jobs were lost by early 2018, with roughly 950,000 directly associated with NAFTA-driven outsourcing and import influx [11]. According to a 2016 Democracy Corps poll, 55 percent of respondents said they were at least somewhat convinced by Trump’s statement that globalization has left American workers behind, while another 15 percent found it to be “a little” convincing [12]. Additionally, anti-establishment sentiment and a lack of faith in political institutions were growing among the public. From the same poll, those convinced by Trump’s statement agreed that the elite benefited at the average worker’s expense [13]. An exit poll from the 2016 election found that three-fifths of voters felt the country had deviated seriously from the right track, and one-fourth were angry with how the government was functioning [14]. Finally, Trump’s rise coincided with the awakening of identity politics from 2010 onward [15]. From then on, systemic racism, LGBTQ+ rights, and other modern social issues have dominated politics and the public conscience. The resulting debates over these topics yielded two contrasting camps that perceive “woke” ideology as either a symbol of progress or cultural perversion. 

In-Group vs. Out-Group Dynamics

    Both Wallace and Trump took advantage of in-group and out-group dynamics to engage with the emotions and biases of their audiences. They undertook this approach because of its impact during tumultuous times. Rather than dividing people on ideological lines, they framed the elections as struggles between core values, such as patriotism [16]. At rallies, they issued statements to strengthen their supporters’ fervor. Wallace sparked strong reactions from Southerners who resented the “redneck” label, while Trump similarly capitalized on Hillary Clinton’s characterization of many of his supporters as “deplorable” [17, 18]. Considering the anxieties of each respective election, this framing was fruitful for two reasons: it identified a perceived enemy responsible for people’s grievances and legitimized those with exclusionary biases. For instance, Wallace’s in-group provided a safe space for whites who felt uneasy about racial integration. Around 83 percent of his supporters believed that racial integration was too rapid compared to the national average of 45 percent [19]. Similarly, Trump’s in-group gave distressed American laborers an outlet to channel worries about job insecurity. He claimed that Mexico was sending its worst citizens and that immigrants were taking American jobs, attracting voters who were nervous about the economy or felt negatively about immigration. The us-versus-them framing was a strategy in and of itself, but it also became a formula in which both figures could install new rhetoric that tapped into the fears of their audiences. 

The Strategy of Victimhood

Wallace and Trump positioned both themselves and the American people as victims of the out-group to garner stronger support. Wallace asserted that the Southern working class was the victim of rapid change and encroachment on its way of life [20]. In doing so, he appealed to whites who were discontent with the state of the country, which activated the Southern voting bloc in his favor. Trump’s  provocation of victimhood involved appealing to a broader scope of “victims.” He criticized globalists, immigrants, and politicians for undermining “ordinary American patriots” [21]. Trump was able to spread the message to a larger audience because his statements victimized the anxious middle class, non-college graduates, the unemployed, and even those with prejudices. As a result, he was able to solidify the support of people who felt left behind by the rest of the country. Victimhood as a strategy is also reflected in the campaign slogans that both Wallace and Trump chose. Wallace’s “Stand Up for America” suggested that aggrieved Americans needed to stand up against the out-group’s wrongdoings. Trump’s infamous “Make America Great Again” slogan expresses the belief that troubled American patriots deserve the simpler life they had before out-groups took over the country. Once their bases were solidified, the two candidates victimized themselves. For example, Wallace stated that he was disregarded by elites because of his Southern identity, and Trump dismissed racist labels he garnered from his discussions concerning U.S. crime [22]. This strategy resulted in Trump and Wallace’s supporters misinterpreting criticism of the candidates as political attacks. This approach was successful because it allowed in-groups to unite under shared grievances, encouraging them to come to the defense of the candidates against any perceived out-group opponent. 

The Fight Against the Establishment

    Standing up against the establishment is the norm for any politician striving to appear populist. Wallace and Trump were successful in this effort because they were able to convince voters that the establishment represented and supported the out-group and was therefore a threat to their values. When attacking the establishment, both used nearly identical tactics with minor differences tailored to their political moments. 

Wallace targeted the intellectual elite for—as he claimed—attempting to control ordinary people and supplanting free thinking in the youth with liberal ideas [23]. Similarly, Trump’s anti-intellectualism challenged universities for pushing a “woke” agenda of race and gender ideology [24]. In both 1968 and 2024, students on college campuses led protests that led to clashes with law enforcement and sometimes, violence. This unique situation allowed both politicians to capitalize on public discontent about students voicing their demands. Thus, they could appeal to public distrust of universities’ ideologies and the unrest that took place on campuses. Additionally, the two figures benefited from Americans believing communism and socialism were grave threats, with Wallace and Trump linking college liberalism or “wokeness” to those threats.

The federal bureaucracy was another focus of their active anti-establishment agendas. However, they attacked from different angles. Wallace condemned bureaucrats for ignoring the middle class and enforcing integration programs, such as busing, which he claimed was an infringement on states’ rights [25]. This attack worked tremendously well in the South, where alienated whites saw desegregation and civil rights mandates as government interference. However, it lacked an appeal outside the region because other states were not as upset by civil rights progress as the post-Jim Crow South. When Trump came after the bureaucracy in 2016, he claimed to be an outsider who could take on corruption. He often cited his “deep state” conspiracy to justify removing unelected officials who, according to him, had gained undue policy influence [26]. Such rhetoric allowed Trump to profit from declining trust in government and political institutions. Only 19 percent of Americans in 2015 believed they could trust the government to do the right thing “just about always” or “most of the time,” which reflected a significant decline from polls in 2001 [27]. With less than one-fifth of the population reporting faith in the government, Trump took advantage of an opportunity to present himself as the outsider capable of changing the country’s trajectory.

Riding the High Social Tides

     Social tensions were essential to Wallace’s rise in the ‘60s.  The Civil Rights Movement and the youth counterculture movement are representative of the tension present in this decade. Desegregation and the expansion of civil rights to Black Americans frustrated the prejudiced white population. The protests that erupted after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination contributed to the racial divide and reinforced white fear of black aggression. The counterculture movement led the charge for other progressive changes throughout the decade—feminism, the sexual revolution, and the anti-war movement through civil disobedience and protest. 

Wallace’s campaign was chiefly centered around silencing these cultural forces, which he characterized as facilitating the anarchy and breakdown of law and order [28]. The phrase “law and order” became a motto of the campaign and served as a dog whistle for racist alarmism that preyed upon white fears. During rallies, Wallace confronted protestors, mocking them to provoke his in-group to his defense. At a Detroit rally, he joked that if the demonstrators were to lie down in front of his car, it would be the last thing they would want to lie down in front of [29]. Wallace’s focus on lawlessness and his ability to galvanize supporters through his rally performances strengthened the pseudo-populist in-group identity he established. As a result, his appeal as a populist candidate who would slow rapid change and unrest continued to grow. 

    Trump’s approach to addressing social tension included much of the same language. However, a key difference between Wallace and Trump was Trump’s ability to inspire fear, compared to the existing fear that Wallace inherited. His popularization of the idea that Mexico’s immigrants were bringing crime to the U.S. produced a wave of distress that kindled xenophobic sentiments. Using data taken from a scale measuring views on immigration and immigration policy from 2014 to 2019, the Chapman University Survey of American Fears found that xenophobia was a significant predictor of a person’s perception of Trump [30]. Trump’s campaign provided a haven for xenophobia, just as Wallace’s did for racism. However, as opposed to Wallace’s, which capitalized on already-existing fears, Trump’s environment was one he created himself when he established his hardline immigration stance and questioned the morality of many immigrants themselves. In 2024, Trump again used people’s implicit biases and pursued culturally divisive topics, such as transgender identity. Understanding the existing prejudice against transgender people, Trump stirred up anger over “men in women’s sports” and the alleged sexual indoctrination of children in schools [31]. By spinning cultural issues into central focuses of his campaign, Trump garnered ardent support from the anti-LGBTQ+ community and parents concerned about their children being influenced by gender ideology. 

George Floyd’s murder in 2020 was another key social issue that Trump intensified, rather than created. The uprisings that followed prompted his stance that the Black Lives Matter movement was a “symbol of hate” that inspired violence and crime [32]. Though he would eventually lose the 2020 election, this strife allowed him to reiterate a Wallace-like “law and order” message that attracted those afraid of the protests. He also championed the slogan “All Lives Matter”, which was adopted by many in opposition to Black Lives Matter. Despite his electoral defeat, Trump’s rhetoric in 2020 effectively divided an in-group of non-protesters from an out-group of protestors. This division may have contributed to his political comeback in 2024, especially when pro-Palestine student protests swept the nation and reignited backlash from Trump’s supporters. 

What Wallace and Trump Teach Us About Pseudo-Populism

The opening months of Trump’s second term have produced widespread anxiety through the reshaping of the government, mass deportations, tariff threats, and challenges to the Constitution. His influence poses a question about the future of the Republican Party’s campaign efforts and whether the Democrats will seek their own genre of populism in a future party rebrand. If such sentiments sharpen over the next three years, a new type of Democrat may be poised to rise, while the Republican successor will face the difficult task of taming the fears of American voters. Populism may be an answer for the Democrats’ 2024 woes, with a pseudo-populist of a similar style potentially finding success among voters. 

Trump and Wallace are not exceptions but examples of a political dynamic backed by modern American history. These two political figures teach a valuable lesson: political and social tumult allow pseudo-populism to thrive. For opportunists seeking national office, public fear offers an unparalleled opportunity to quickly mobilize voters using emotionally charged campaigning. A signature of pseudo-populist campaigns is their emphasis on grievances and evoking emotions. Yet, in a recent election where fear was at the crux of both major campaigns, the line between pseudo-populism and good faith populism may begin to blur. Even so, not all American sentiments are long-term, and as anxiety is expected to decline in the years to follow, the fear-based campaign is likely to follow suit.