China is the Biggest Winner of the Russo-Ukrainian War

During the Cold War, top officials in Washington feared war between China and the Soviet Union [1]. But since the Soviet Union’s fall, Russia and China have increasingly collaborated with the shared interest of undermining American hegemony. The Russo-Ukrainian War has brought China and Russia’s alliance into the spotlight, as the West’s support of Ukraine strengthened partnerships between the two countries. While the West’s efforts weakened the Russian economy and military, they also strengthened China’s position to undertake expansion of its own.
By relying on China to sustain its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has forfeited some leverage in its relationship with the state. When Western countries sanctioned Russia—freezing its assets, targeting its oil industry, and stopping imports of military materials—the nation turned to China [2]. China provides Russia with critical components for weapons manufacturing and dual-use technology, both of which Russia needs to continue its invasion of Ukraine.
Besides being dependent on China to maintain its military capabilities, Russia depends on trade with China to counteract the economic pressure of sanctions. As part of their sanctions, Western countries have limited purchases of certain Russian goods, like oil, lowering demand for these products. This lowered the prices of Russian goods, benefiting the main purchaser of Russian goods, China. Despite China’s economic advantage in this situation, trade between the two countries is more significant for Russia. China is Russia’s top partner for both imports and exports, while Russia doesn’t make the top five in imports or top ten in exports for China [3]. Russia needs China, but China does not need Russia.
Russia and China’s Competing Interests
While China and Russia share an interest in challenging America’s power, they have competing interests in Central Asia and the Arctic. China seeks to develop Central Asia for its own benefit, a process it has already started by investing in oil pipelines and railways in the region [4]. These ventures reduce China’s dependency on Russia by providing easier access to oil and foreign markets. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin continues to hold the Cold War era view that Central Asia is part of Russia’s “privileged sphere of influence” and has tried to maintain security and economic relationships with countries in the region [5]. However, Russia may struggle to sustain these relationships as its economy and military weaken due to the war.
China’s dominance is more stark in the Arctic, where the nation has started working with Arctic states other than Russia to explore its interests in the region. For example, China set up research stations in Iceland and Norway, searching for oil [6]. The Arctic is believed to contain large undiscovered deposits of oil and gas, two resources central to Russia’s economy, so the region holds great strategic importance for Russia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused the country to be economically isolated by Western sanctions, so Russia can no longer look to the West for funding to develop the Arctic. Russia needs China to finance its projects in the Arctic, which is what makes China’s collaboration with other Arctic states worrisome for Russia. Now, Russia has to compete to secure funding for its projects in the Arctic. China and Russia’s partnership in the Arctic mirrors their trade relationship: China is Russia’s only possible partner, but China has options outside of Russia. If Russia works with China in the Arctic, their collaboration will favor China.
The Chinese Threat to Russia’s Far East
Still, China’s interests in Central Asia and the Arctic pose a lesser threat than its ventures in Russia’s Far East. The region provides access to the Pacific and possesses rare earth elements, including copper, iron, oil, and gas. These largely untapped materials are particularly strategic to China’s manufacturing-dependent economy [7]. Russia needs China’s help to finance the development of the Far East, but China has been slow to follow through on its promises for investments to help build up the region. China invests more in developing the infrastructure of other countries than any other nation [8]. It is uncharacteristic of China to hesitate to invest in the Russian Far East. This suggests that Beijing is biding its time, and may be waiting for Russia to weaken, further driving down the prices of Russian resources.
Putin is not just under economic pressure from China regarding the Russian Far East; he is well aware that Russia is at a military disadvantage in the region. Chinese civilians outnumber Russian civilians seventeen to one in the regions around the border between the two countries [9]. This has left Moscow worried about illegal Chinese migration into the Russian Far East, which would give China political power in the region and could eventually lead to irredentist territorial claims by China. Additionally, China’s army has far more troops than Russia’s, an imbalance that will only grow as Russia continues to lose soldiers in its war with Ukraine. The war is also depleting Russia’s weapons stocks, and because Western countries continue to sanction weapons technology to Russia, the nation has turned to China to supply what it needs to create new weapons. China could stop supplying Russia with weapons and the materials needed to create them, weakening Russia’s defense capabilities. If China were to make a territorial claim to the region, it would hold the cards to carry out its irredentist demands.
The United States’ Weakness
The Russo-Ukrainian War has not only weakened Russia’s power but also revealed that the United States is ill-equipped to aid its allies. The United States has succeeded in crippling Russia at a relatively low cost without deploying troops, yet support for Ukraine in the United States is dwindling [10]. This does not bode well for Taiwan, which would be far costlier for the West to defend than Ukraine [11]. One reason China has held back from invading Taiwan is fear of going to war with the United States, but defending Taiwan will likely be less popular than aiding Ukraine is, given the high costs. The Biden Administration reversed the United States’ decades-long policy of strategic ambiguity by pledging to defend Taiwan, but President Trump reverted to strategic ambiguity shortly after taking office [12]. This has left the world uncertain about what the response would be from the Trump administration, or future administrations, if China invaded Taiwan. Beijing knows that if the American people are against defending Taiwan, it is far less likely that America will give Taiwan the support it needs to defend itself against China. The West’s fatigue of supporting foreign wars encourages China to make a move against Taiwan.
In addition to indicating a lack of support to defend Taiwan, the Russo-Ukrainian war has revealed the United States’ incapability to defend Taiwan in a full-scale war against China. The United States is failing to meet Ukraine’s need for basic ammunition, as the Pentagon has focused on high-tech weapons while leaving basic artillery to be manufactured with Cold-War-era machinery that can not keep up with the production in China and Russia [13]. The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed to the world that the United States' military manufacturing capacity is outdated. Beijing sees that the United States is lacking in military strength and popular support to defend Taiwan, and this may be the encouragement it needs to finally invade the island nation.
Propping up the United States’ support for Ukraine is the idea that a win against Russia is a win for America, but in the modern era, China is a far greater rival to the United States than Russia. The Russo-Ukrainian war has weakened Russia, meaning China will assert its influence over Central Asian countries, which will further strengthen China’s economic power. Combined with the metal and energy resources that China stands to negotiate out of a weakened Russia, China is poised to become an economic powerhouse that rivals the United States. The Russo-Ukrainian War has also shown China that the United States is not prepared politically or militarily to stop aggression against its allies, something that could motivate China to finally invade Taiwan. No matter the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the conflict has weakened Russia and exposed the United States' lack of willingness and ability to fight a war. A win for Russia, or a win against Russia, is a win for China.
Sources
[1] Holdridge, John. "Comments of Soviet Embassy Officer on China and Vietnam." U.S. State Department. June 13th, 1969. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.5.pdf.
[2] “What are the sanctions on Russia and have they affected its economy?” BBC. February 23rd, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659.
[3] World Bank. “Trade statistics by Country / Region.” World Bank. https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?lang=en.
[4] Šćepanović, Janko. “The Sheriff and the Banker? Russia and China in Central Asia.” War on the Rocks. June 13th, 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/the-sheriff-and-the-banker-russia-and-china-in-central-asia/.
[5] Stronski, Paul and Nicole Ng. “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. February 28th, 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2018/02/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-the-russian-far-east-and-the-arctic?lang=en.
[6] Hunnicutt, Trevor. “Trump declines to answer question about China and Taiwan.” Reuters. February 26th, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-declines-answer-question-about-china-taiwan-2025-02-26/.
[7] Stronski and Ng, “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia.”
[8] Government Accountability Office. “China’s Foreign Investments Significantly Outpace the United States. What does that mean?” Government Accountability Office. October 16th, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/blog/chinas-foreign-investments-significantly-outpace-united-states.-what-does-mean.
[9] Stronski and Ng, “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia.”
[10] Brenan, Megan. “More Americans Favor Quick End to Russia-Ukraine War.” Gallup. December 20th, 2024. https://news.gallup.com/poll/654575/americans-favor-quick-end-russia-ukraine-war.aspx.
[11] Khrestin, Igor. “The Russo-Ukrainian War: Implications for Taiwan.” Global Taiwan Institute. June 28th, 2023. https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/06/taiwanese-perspectives-on-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-and-its-implications/.
[12] Hunnicutt, Trevor. “Trump Declines to Answer Question about China and Taiwan.” Reuters. February 26th, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-declines-answer-question-about-china-taiwan-2025-02-26/.
[13] Tiron, Roxana and Billy House. “America’s War Machine Can’t Make Basic Artillery Fast Enough.” Bloomberg. June 7th, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-us-global-war-weapons-race/.