Gang members fix their weapons in Cité Soleil Slum in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Tuesday, May 28, 2019. (Photo/Dieu Nalio Chery)

Haiti is currently in a state of anarchy. Gangs control the majority of the capital, Port-au-Prince, with some estimates claiming that as much as 80 percent of the city is under gang control [1]. The Haitian government is in shambles, unable to maintain rule over the nation. Steps have been taken to reestablish civil rule. The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) has already created the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) to aid Haiti in rebuilding its democracy [2]. However, the council has yet to achieve its goal of holding a popular vote for a new president in Haiti, and it is questionable whether they are on track to reach this target. Raising Haiti out of chaos will be no easy feat, but it is far from impossible for a capable military, such as that of the United States. It is essential to understand the history that led to the current state of affairs to understand how the future of the nation may play out.

Haiti is no stranger to struggle and discord. The nation started as a French colony, with an economy built upon sugar plantations utilizing slave labor, stunting the growth of the nation. Haiti successfully led a slave revolt to expel French rule, only for the French to impose the equivalent of over twenty billion U.S. dollars in reparations or face invasion [3]. More recently, Haiti was ruled by the oppressive regime of Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier and Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier for nearly 30 years. During this period in the mid-to-late twentieth century, their rule caused abject poverty across the nation [4]. The nation faced further tribulations this century due to an earthquake in 2010, which killed an estimated 300,000 people [5]. This earthquake is one of the worst natural disasters in recorded history, a difficult price to pay for even the most prosperous of nations and even more so for a nation as impoverished as Haiti [6]. 

The assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse was the spark that lit the fire of anarchy. On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was killed by a team of 28 mercenaries, 26 of whom were Colombian and the remaining two being Haitian-Americans [7]. The precise reason for the assassination is unclear, but experts speculate that it was due to Moïse’s connections with South American drug cartels [8]. Prime Minister Ariel Henry became the acting president to fill the vacant position. Henry was supposed to step down and hold elections by February 7, 2024, but did not do so [9]. This dismissal of the law caused mass protests and rioting across the country, especially in Port-au-Prince. Gangs began to carry out increasing acts of violence during this time of unrest. 

Haiti has over 200 gangs, half of which operate within Port-au-Prince [10]. Many of these gangs began to ally with one another as the Haitian government failed to reassert control. Two major factions contested for power: G9 Families and Allies and GPep. These gangs have been rivals for years previous and each seeks to capitalize upon the current state of anarchy in order to cement themselves as the premier power [11]. Gangs first caused greater disorder by seizing government institutions, such as hospitals, and carrying out mass jailbreaks. In early March 2024, gangs released over 3,700 inmates and killed at least 12 people as they stormed two of the largest prisons in Haiti [12]. Consequently, such acts emboldened the gangs, leading to further atrocities across all of Haiti. Subsequently, gang members descended upon Pont-Sondé, an agricultural town about 100 kilometers north of Port-au-Prince, in October 2024. The attackers murdered over 115 civilians, including women and children; over 6,200 survivors fled the town in the following days [13].

CARICOM formulated the TPC, consisting of nine members from various political parties and social groups, to reestablish democratic rule in Haiti through diplomatic means. The council is tasked with finding a new Prime Minister and holding certain presidential powers until February 7, 2026, as a new president must be inaugurated by then [14, 15]. The gangs do not recognize the presidential council’s authority and the council lacks the teeth necessary to enforce its control over the nation. For instance, Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier, leader of G9 Families and Allies, announced that he would fight to oppose the work of the presidential council [16]. Additionally, he threatened the lives of those on the council and their families. Diplomatic challenges to the presidential council have also arisen. Gary Conille, previous head of UNICEF’s Latin America regional office, was appointed to be the interim Prime Minister but was fired from the position in November 2024 [17]. The firing created another power vacuum at the pinnacle of Haitian politics which hampers efforts to fight against the gangs [18]. Firing Conille poses a major setback for the reestablishment of democratic rule because it demonstrates that the presidential council faces internal problems. Haiti has long been held back by political infighting and factionalism, and the council firing Conille can be seen as a continuation of this trend [19]. 

The United Nations (UN) has sent Kenyan police into Haiti to fight the gangs and restore peace. Though well-intentioned, this plan has found only minimal success and is unable to pacify Haiti. U.N. missions to the nation have a dismal history. For example, many UN peacekeepers were sent to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake that devastated the country. Among these peacekeepers was a force from Bangladesh that brought cholera with them. This strain of cholera then swept through the already devastated Haiti, killing over 10,000 people [20]. The UN has admitted that this outbreak would not have happened if not for its peacekeeping efforts [21]. A history of sexual abuse by UN forces in Haiti results in further distrust. An academic paper interviewed Haitians living in areas with peacekeepers and ten percent of those interviewed raised concerns over children fathered by peacekeepers [22]. Many of these children are the result of peacekeepers raping local women. Such abuses are not exclusive to Haiti— they are widespread enough that the UN has sought to address the trend on an international level through psychological and job programs for victims [23]. Despite these steps forward, the memory of rape and abuse remains in the Haitian psyche, causing distrust of further UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, a history of abuse by Kenyan police forces only contributes to this distrust. Over one-third of Kenyans report experiencing police abuse or harassment. Additionally, between 2019 and 2021, the Kenyan police killed over five hundred people [24]. This history of disease and abuse gives good reason to believe that Haitian populations will be wary of any UN efforts. As a result, Kenyan forces face an uphill battle resulting from negative perceptions of the UN in Haiti and will be rendered less effective. 

Any attempt by Kenyan troops to quell the gangs is made impossible by their lack of manpower. There are currently 400 Kenyan police officers in Haiti, with 600 more being trained to bring the total to 1,000 troops by the end of 2024 [25]. The mission is intended to have 2,500 troops in its entirety [26]. Even if this number is eventually met, it will be inadequate to combat the hundreds of gangs across the nation of over ten million people. A lack of adequate armaments further adds to the difficulty of the Kenyan mission. Key air support in the form of helicopters is notably missing from the UN forces [27]. Many Haitian roads are impassable due to barricades or disrepair, making air power necessary for adequate patrols and rescue missions [28]. Without these armaments to give the police an advantage, they are left to fight well-armed gangs that are only increasing in sophistication. Many of the gangs traffick arms, allowing them to acquire weaponry such as AK-47 and M-15 rifles [29]. Such a situation has led to claims that the gangs are better armed than the Haitian police. Facing both a lack of manpower and firepower, it seems impossible that the Kenyan forces can pacify the Haitian gangs.

With current diplomatic solutions and interventions proving incapable of solving the gang problem, other options must be considered. The best solution is found less than 1,000 miles away: the U.S. military. This fighting force has previously intervened in chaotic countries, such as those in the Middle East, to establish democracy in the territory. The operations necessary to take control of Afghanistan or Iraq were far more sophisticated than what would be necessary to pacify Haiti. Therefore, the U.S. military may be capable of rebuilding a democratic government in the Caribbean nation.

Some may dispute the necessity of previous U.S. foreign interventions, but it is undeniable that they display a level of sophistication greater than what is required to dismantle Haitian gangs. U.S. involvement in Syria as it fought the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) demonstrated these capabilities. At its peak, ISIL controlled approximately one-third of Syria and forty percent of Iraq, an area of over 200,000 square kilometers, which is nearly ten times the size of the entirety of Haiti [30]. This area held some 7.7 million people in it, a population slightly less than Haiti [31]. ISIL demonstrated its military might by pushing back the Iraqi Security Forces and taking major cities such as Mosul and Raqqa. The U.S. was able to push back and effectively defeat ISIL through the use of its superior technology and the help of local allies. Fighting in urban areas such as Mosul acted as a display of the U.S.’s ability to take contested urban areas from guerilla insurgent forces. The destruction of ISIL in Syria would not have been possible without the U.S., and demonstrates that the U.S. military would be as effective or more effective of a force in Haiti [32]. ISIL is a far more organized group than any of the Haitian gangs, evident in its international attacks and subsidiary groups. In contrast, the gangs are all vying for control against one another. This fighting weakens each of the gangs, as they expend resources combating other gangs. Such infighting has resulted in none of the gangs exerting the level of organization or international influence that ISIL was able to. The shorter distance between the U.S. and Haiti compared to the U.S. and Syria would further simplify the operation. Supply lines would be far shorter and much of the military organization could be done within the U.S., decreasing the logistical difficulty of troops stationed abroad. Additionally, Haitian gangs are far less motivated than ISIL combatants. The gangs fight for power, influence, and money, as opposed to ISIL, which fights for religious reasons. This means the ISIL fighters are more willing to take part in long protracted conflicts as their motivations are greater than those of the gangs. A smaller territory to pacify, a weaker fighting force to combat, shorter supply lines, and a less motivated force means the U.S. would have a far simpler time fighting in Haiti than it did in Syria. Therefore, it is evident that the U.S. is more than capable of eliminating the threat of Haitian gangs.

The U.S. would still face the challenge of reestablishing democracy in Haiti once the gangs are subdued. While difficult, the U.S. has experience setting up democracies in far more strenuous situations. Afghanistan is an example. Though now thought of as a failure due to the collapse of the state once the U.S. pulled out, it was a functioning democracy for nearly twenty years [33]. Similarly to the fight against ISIL, the U.S. faced a far more difficult situation in Afghanistan than it would in Haiti. The Taliban is a far superior force to Haitian gangs, Afghanistan is farther from the U.S. than Haiti, and Afghanistan is nearly ten times the size of Haiti. The U.S. would be able to establish a competent democracy in Haiti due to the simplification of factors compared to Afghanistan. Additionally, Haiti still has a functioning—though weak—government. Governmental presence further decreases the weight the U.S. would have to carry, as it would only need to strengthen the existing government, not construct a new one. Intervening in Haiti to help a struggling democracy would help the U.S., too, as it would be a public demonstration of the nation’s commitment to democracy. Moreover, it would show that the U.S. is still willing and able to use military force to intervene abroad. This fact would deter U.S. adversaries, such as China or Iran, from attacking American allies. 

Many Haitians do not trust the U.S. or the possibility of U.S. intervention due to the history between the two countries. The U.S. occupation of Haiti for nearly two decades, sending aid to the Duvalier regime, and other interventions cause Haitians to see the U.S. as the source of the nation’s problems [34]. The Haitian population’s distrust increases the difficulty of quelling violence in the nation. However, the U.S. can still dispel gangs in Haiti because, as previously discussed, the challenges the U.S. would experience in the Caribbean nation would be less severe than those encountered in the Middle East. That said, it is reasonable to assert that U.S. involvement today would have greater support than in the past. Three out of four Haitians believe that the Haitian police need the help of an international force in order to reestablish control over the country [35]. Additionally, previous U.S. involvement in Haiti has helped reestablish democracy in the nation, as seen in the 1994 mission to reinstate the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide [36]. 

The chaotic situation Haiti finds itself in is not impossible to fix. Current attempts at solutions are inadequate. Diplomatic attempts in the form of the presidential council fail to hold any real weight. The UN intervention with Kenyan troops lacks both manpower and armaments and will thus fail to dispel the gangs. The U.S., while imperfect, may be able to complete the job. U.S. military forces have faced situations far more difficult than those of Haiti in both Syria and Afghanistan. Despite these challenges, the U.S. was able to pacify those nations and establish democracy. Therefore, U.S. intervention offers the best and only path toward democracy in Haiti.